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ABSTRACT 
With recent developments in political globalization, self-identifying “cosmopolitans” have 
overwhelmed the scholarly discourse. This article examines the moral claims behind the theory 
of cosmopolitanism—in its political universal form—while being especially cautious of claims 
of such true universalism, and its likely dangerous applications. This entails a brief analysis into 
certain justified universalist legal traditions; an example of such is found in the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). In examining the theory and application of western-originated 
cosmopolitanism, we not only see how theoretical claims of moral superiority are wrong, but that 
they are alive and well in western theories. In application, it follows that even (slightly) milder 
legal traditions, like the ICC, imply this unjustified moral superiority. 
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1 Introduction 
IN THE 21ST CENTURY, we have experienced phenomenal heights in global governance. The ICC, 
United Nations (UN), powers of the Security Council, and treaties that emanated from the UN 
Declaration of Human Rights all testify to this. However, there is indeed a downside to such an 
arrangement, one unlike anything we have seen before; a clash of an entire gathering of states  
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with individual state sovereignty, a global, moral status quo, expectations of every nation in 
terms of having a basic legal structure, market/economic system (capitalism), and even a form of 
global culture that follows from it. 
I argue that the forms of force and pressure applied to non-conforming states, such asthat 
purported by the ICC and expectation of the global legal status quo — though indeed may have 
origins in moral claims or generally universal principles — constitute a legal and moral breach of 
the sovereignty of states, peoples, and individuals everywhere in the world. That is, if the beliefs 
of equality amongst all individuals holds true, and if we believe that imperialism along with 
either explicit or implicit imposition of political, legal, and ideological beliefs (which follow 
from these global developments) onto countries and peoples within them is a morally wrong 
thing, then one must reject any sort of global imposition of governance or moral principles off-
hand. We will examine how, without exception, there can be no such thing as imposed global 
governance that does not imply imperialist and claims of moral superiority. The point of this 
paper, as I have stated, is not to look at the quality and efforts of cosmopolitan and similar post-
enlightenment theorists’ arguments, or at least the substance of each and every one of them. 
Rather the objective of this paper is to analyze the objectivity of this universal legal tradition, or 
lack thereof, and see if it is inherently imperialist. 
2 Eurocentric subjectivity 
We know well that the notion of the ‘Cosmopolitan’ dates back to the ancient greek Stoics, who 
adopted a cosmopolitan approach, as opposed to the approach of “cosmopolitanism”. Sypnowich 
identifies the schism between the two; whereas the original notion of a ‘global citizen’ referred 
to more of a personal belief and situation, a possible guidance of domestic policy and attitude 
towards others in an open way, the latter refers to the political and legal attempt at putting 
peoples within a global tradition of morality and legal expectations—something often identified 
with imperialism.  The second, i.e. political cosmopolitanism, emanated and drew from the 1
original understanding, taking its incarnation comprehensively first (arguably) in the form of 
Immanuel Kant’s vision for a global community of states.  The whole origin and problem with 
this notion of universal application, rather than theoretical acceptance of the individual or state 
(as was the case with the stoics), necessarily implies such international cross-cultural conflict 
when those of other cultures reject this application. 
Kant, taking partial form in his famous Perpetual Peace,  proposes a comprehensive universal 2
political theory. Specifically, in his hope to achieve perpetual peace amongst nations, entailing 
the elimination of war and moral, consensus-based cooperation between states, he proposed a 
series of rules and moral expectations to be followed.  Though it has been criticized for its lack 3
of enforceability of the claims, some have read it to eventually pave out a road to a legally 
enforceable system, and others have adopted it to fit a more ‘suitable’ form in the modern day.   4
 2
International Journal of Political Theory
 | Vol. 1, No. 1 2016 | ISSN: 2371-3321
Published by Emertec R&D
Website: www.emertec.ca
Whatever be the case, the problem with the approach itself is its blatant lack of, or even respect 
to attempt to adhere to ‘open universalism’—universalism that crosses the bounds of cultures 
and peoples. Kant, likely limited by the overwhelming presence of the Orientalist, Eurocentric 
approach to politics present at the time in Europe, kept his view of morality, governance, and law 
from a western perspective.  Even though Kant acknowledged that even the ‘savages’ of the 5
world could build their civilization and join the league of nations (hence discouraging 
imperialism),  the statement in itself and through its utter lack of appreciation and inclusion of 6
non-European standards is purely subjective from a European point of view. As an example 
amongst many, when Kant states that “[t]he Civil Constitution in every State shall be 
Republican,”  or that “[e]very form of Government, in fact, which is not representative, is 7
properly a spurious form of Government or not a form of Government at all…”  demonstrates 8
this deficiency.  9
Interestingly, along some lines of scholarship, this very clear tendency to have a lack of 
consideration and acknowledgement, this very subjective line of view, is still present. Let us take 
the example of the late John Rawls, who suggested a Kant-based ideal of a “realistic utopia,” 
referring to a global organization of states and fundamental moral expectations, more generally 
an order for the world, as described in his book The Law of Peoples, an international application 
of his A Theory of Justice.  This ideal global solution builds upon the assumption that liberal 10
democracies, the western ideal of the social contract to be ‘good’, enough to be set as a standard 
for the world. What he calls ‘decent’ societies may be included in this group of states,  while 11
other, so-called “indecent” peoples are not to be included.  Many scholars have no problem with 12
the statements, and others have criticized it for being to permissive towards illiberal peoples. 
Where did Rawls go wrong?  
Amongst many problems, one of the problems with his ranking of societies, specifically, his 
permitting of human rights violators to be dealt with through force, can be found as a version of 
this applied imperialism. He calls these societies “indecent” and illiberal societies. Furthermore, 
Rawls states that “burdened” societies are those “whose historical, social and economic 
circumstances make their achieving a well-ordered regime, whether liberal or decent, difficult if 
not impossible.”  As a response, Rawls recommends an establishment of “appropriate” political 13
and social culture, ensuring that they are capable of rationally handling their affairs.  14
I do not doubt Rawls’ personal intentions, but this agenda to reform any nonconformist society is 
unacceptable and paternalistic. Such a blatantly obvious remark, surprisingly, was only captured 
by Professor John Hobson, who pointed out that Rawls’ theories are another example of 
Europe’s long-forgotten bias of Eurocentrism.   Here, I would assert that Rawls exemplifies and 15
endorses the notion of the 19th century mission civilisatrice, the title for the French imperialist 
mission to reform and ‘help’ undeveloped societies. In doing so, Rawls takes a more extreme 
position relative to Kant’s.  It may be argued that Rawls supports multi-lateral, as opposed to 16
unilateral interventions and action towards other ‘peoples’. The problem is that it is still illogical 
to believe that multilateralism changes or expands the legitimacy of the values upon which the 
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intervention is made to be true. In other words, many countries engaging in unified intervention 
does not change the imperialist nature of that intervention.  
It is important to understand that Rawls does not take liberal cosmopolitanism as his standard, 
and rejects its foreign policy. However, he still does create a moral hierarchy of societies—
arguably, doing this frees Rawls from having to claim true universalism. That being said, we 
have yet to pinpoint the source of the problem with Rawls’ arguments. 
When one identifies that Rawls is ranking societies and deciding their fate, the illogicality from 
doing so arises from the fact that Rawls cannot prove that his hierarchy of societies is derived 
from an ultimate source of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. In Rawls’ words, “decent” and “indecent” 
societies are decent and indecent because of Rawls’ opinion, not due to it being ground in 
absolute truth.  However, Rawls is not making claims to know the absolute truth. One must then 17
point out how the application of his theory can be right, if he cannot prove that the theory is right 
or universal in any sense. My problem is not Rawls’ convincing moral argument—his vision for 
a realistic, global utopia—but rather his utter subjectivity and myopic  outlook. Rawls’ lack of 18
questioning the notion of morality, and the effects it clearly takes an imperialist outlook, and his 
inability to entertain the question of what makes something moral is the problem. 
The latter discussion tackles the true universalism in a liberal outlook, for now it is just important 
to understand that the liberally-derived moral outlook,  itself is problematic as it infers a non-19
justifiable moral inequality.  
Skorupski’s liberal theory of cosmopolitanism is a milder example of the myopic approach 
adopted by cosmopolitan interventionists. Favouring intervention on the universality of human 
rights, saying “human rights are rights whose violation can in principle ground a rectificatory 
intervention by anyone at all, not just by someone authorized by those whose rights are violated, 
or by some member of the relevant polity or collective.”  Clearly, this may be understood as 20
problematic when one does not question the grounds for such rights, whether or not which rights, 
or rights in general, may be measured on absolute moral grounds—which they cannot absolutely. 
Hence, suggesting that “the ordinary conception of moral rights is sufficiently settled and stable 
to underpin this condition, without broaching deeper philosophical questions about the 
foundation of rights as such,”  is flawed in nature. This is because the action or imposition 21
assumes that rights and their enforcement mechanisms are right, and others are not. This implies 
the existence of a moral high-ground, an imperialistic outlook, to which one may respond: ‘who 
are you to tell me what’s right and wrong if we really are all free and equal?’ This question, 
which occasionally perturbs the individual, is never answered. What is important to realize is that 
the lack of attention of the author to a) universalize a theory of human rights, and b) universalize 
the application of enforcement for those rights. Although this is beyond the scope of the paper, it 
is interesting to note that even if human rights theorists have demonstrated universality of 
fundamental concepts such as the right to life, the enforcement, trial, interpretation, and other 
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mechanisms could never possibly be universalized for the simple fact that every locality of every 
country has a different legal enforcement system in place. 
From a relevant post-colonial, Islamic point of view, Abdullah Ahmed An-Na’im takes it upon 
himself to convince others to adopt liberal western legal and moral standards. An-Na’im claims 
that because West, through colonization has already implemented its forms of governance, and 
that those countries choose to keep the bulk of those things, it logically follows to adopt the same 
conception of rights and legal framework , to “ensure a minimal degree of practical 22
compliance.”  Interestingly, this is an even more extreme idea proposed, more than Rawls’ 23
treatment with burdened on indecent societies, as it attempts to morally convince the previously 
colonized population to not adopt their own legal traditions(s). There is no reason why any 
population should be constrained to western interpretations and applications of laws on the 
institutions they created, setting the standard. Even amongst the West, no two countries have the 
same form of law (and hence, same standards) to deal with the argument. It is important to 
quickly reject this notion of reasoning, but interesting to view the multi-dimensionality of the 
scholarly discourse. I now turn to identifying the core of this universal argument. 
In an essay, Nussbaum reviews the tension between the Communitarian Nietzschians and 
Universalist Kantians, stating that the former was “based less on reason and more on communal 
solidarity, less on principle and more on affiliation, less on optimism for progress than on a sober 
acknowledgment of human finitude.”  This attitude is echoed in McIntyre’s rejection of morality 24
and universality on the terms of separating morality less as an absolute feeling or natural 
ideology, but an act to justify actions or attitudes.  This borderlines Schmitt’s ideological 25
standpoint on seeing liberal ideology as disguised manipulation in the cover of morality. Though 
it is certainly possible that moral discussion and ideology may be manipulation or imperialism in 
disguise—which does occur—it is not necessarily true for many universalists and thinkers  who 26
are more genuinely trying to create general consensus. This same criticism is applied by 
Habermas to this opinion, deconstructed for the most part in the latter section. My problem lies, 
adjacent to the Nietzschean philosophical tradition, with the assumption that morality is 
universal, and that such universal values can be absolutely measured—we know they cannot.  
The point here is not to make any particular claims about the modern development of 
international moral norms, it is to identify the very important background and theoretical 
framework that modern-day theorists have been analyzing the world through. The largely moral 
perspective displayed from Kant to today has been deconstructed, nailing the issue to the point 
that follows: there is no dictator of moral values, if all are equal, and all share different moral 
values, then no matter how much any party claims to be universalist, helpful, generous, etc., they 
cannot be considered valid on an objective basis. Furthermore, it implies that any such claims of 
absolute morality and universality, when a strictly western approach is taken, cannot be 
entertained, and it is important to identify within the scholarly discourse such claims and discard 
them. From this point, we analyze other, universal claims, their objectivity and validity, with the 
ICC as a revolving theme. In a modern context, this realization that there is no such thing as 
absolute morality is found in studies like that of Pahuja’s,  where in her detailed political and 27
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economic analysis of recent global events, found that neo-imperial and neo-colonial attitudes are 
present and flourishing in the modern world. The following section rather takes a moral and legal 
view of how these broad trends are found within the context of international law. 
3 The Problem with Habermasian ‘Discourse Ethics’ 
Jürgen Habermas is famous for - among other things - his endorsement of the once-highly 
popular use of discourse ethics as an endorsement of international law. He applies his logic of 
discourse ethics from the level of deliberative democracy, to that of an international universal, 
legal order. In his Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action,  he makes the specific 28
argument that consent is what forms the validity and ability of enforcement; that is legally 
justified (on his terms) creates a universal idea. He argues that, put in very simple terms, “only 
those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in 
their capacity as participants in a practical discourse.”  This also implies, as he mentions, that a 29
party that wishes to withdraw its position after it has consented is not legally valid. Once you 
have entered the contract, you can’t leave it. Leaving does not diminish from the fact that the 
party agreed to this universal norm—termed the “Universalization Principle”. He thereby uses 
what is intersubjective, common accepted, to make something ‘right’ or ‘legitimate’. Responding 
to Schmitt’s criticisms of the politicization of human rights, he dismisses the proposition of 
morality dictating the existence of human rights, stating that “[t]he conception of human rights 
does not have its origins in morality; [but] is…distinctly juridical in character”  in an attempt to 30
legally justify such actions. Habermas bases his legal defence of Kant on the two major 
principles; a) the UDHR obligating all member states to follow, and b) the UN’s own “right of 
intervention” in the UN Charter.  This is grounded in the notion that all individuals in the world 31
have enforceable rights grounded within an international legal process—this is the same tone 
adopted by Hayden,  who claims that the UDHR obligates all governments, justifying the ICC 32
and legal military intervention. It should be noted that Habermas, though not favouring unilateral 
interventions, still favours the notion of multilateral interventions sanctified by the so-called 
legal process.  33
However, there is a major flaw in this sort of argument, which forms a partial basis for my 
theory. Regarding this position, Thomassen points out that “this begs the question of the 
rationality of the discursive testing...”  — questioning the fact that there is no guarantee of the 34
rationality of such a universal principle made in this way. I will simply modify this objection, 
directing it to the fact that there is no guarantee of the “universal” principle being a moral one—
let alone a universal standard, for two reasons. Firstly, it is illogical to think that morality and law 
will always coincide. Thomas Jefferson once said, “If a law is unjust, a man is not only right to 
disobey it, he is obligated to do so.”  In the case of international law, theoretically, laws are 35
expected to be created on moral grounds—state signatories to agreements reasonably except 
moral legal structures and laws. One must then ask if it is right to agree, or continue to agree to a 
convention or a consented law if they don’t consider it right. From this premise, it follows that a 
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state, whether due to a change in outlook or in regime, would logically be morally obliged to 
revoke international obligations without pending enforcement. 
Secondly, and more to the point, there is absolutely no guarantee that this consensus could be an 
absolute moral standard. My colleagues and I have recently attempted to answer the question, 
“what is true?” We conclude that in order for something to be valid as a fundamental, human 
standard, it must pass very basic logical conditions. Thus, it must have a true origin, and its 
essence cannot change through time, space, or perception;  i.e. something that is true cannot not 36
be not-true through time—even if an observation is no longer such (the substance changes), the 
explanation/principle governing the explanation of this change/observation does not change (the 
form). Here that we are talking about a standard for humanity, not some impermanent legal 
structure: something universal, like human rights. If, for instance, a group of people got together 
and decided there was no right to life, and another decided there was one; assuming both are true 
assumes that the value of human life is subject to peoples’ beliefs; this is not consistent with 
basic tenets of logic. Even if we only include the second criterion (absoluteness), it is illogical to 
for this universal standard to be a product of certain individuals’ opinions at a certain point in 
time. Habermas’ theory operates external to a logical ranking of true and false — which I happen 
to believe in. Habermas' undetected but biggest error is that he conflates our knowledge in the 
present moment with knowledge of the Truth (deliberately capitalized). 
But this discussion reaches a dead end, and cannot be taken on the merits of logic, belief, or 
another criteria. It is possible that a “universal” standard—“universal” according to Habermas — 
applying to human beings or states is not morally justifiable, and that the morally right thing to 
do is contrary to the deliberation following Habermas’ procedure. It is precisely because we do 
not know what morality is that we cannot penalize somebody — say, a defector from Habermas’ 
contract—for doing something that is in their view moral. Anybody — like Habermas or myself
—can advance theories; but our inability to know if an advanced theory is really legitimate leads 
us to not justify enforcing our theories of morality onto others’. 
This leads to the point I want to make on the higher plane regarding methodology. In Habermas’ 
opinion, right and wrong (morality) is dictated by the process of universalization he proposes. I 
disagree. But this is beyond the larger point, namely: that we may never know whether 
something is ultimately or always inherently “good” or “bad”. If a state were to at one point 
agree with Habermas (viz., that something is right by consent), and consented to a principle, and 
then, on grounds of believing in a different view of morality, withdrew from the principle as 
previously agreed (say, on religious grounds), it would be a moral imposition to penalize the 
withdrawing party. For instance, Iran agreed with the morality of the UDHR, and consented to it, 
implicitly based in the belief of Habermas’ system of legitimization. After the Iranian revolution, 
the country revoked its association with the UDHR due to so-called un-Islamic values in the 
document.  If, say, the UDHR itself contained a clause permitting penalization for revocation, it 37
would be a moral imposition to carry it out, as Iran considered itself—based on a different 
 7
International Journal of Political Theory
 | Vol. 1, No. 1 2016 | ISSN: 2371-3321
Published by Emertec R&D
Website: www.emertec.ca
worldview—morally obliged to revoke association with the UDHR. Hence, we have morality vs. 
morality, and any opposition from either side would be exactly that: an imposition 
4 International law and cosmopolitanism 
I will begin with discussing the attempt for some to approach human rights form a legal 
perspective, then shifting specifically towards the case of the ICC, the main theme being the 
discussion of imperialism and western subjectivity. Perhaps the most provocative Kant-aligned 
arguments in favour of justifying international legal traditions is that of Habermas. Off the bat, 
we see that the attitude clearly demonstrates an appreciation of Kant’s ideal of the world; 
planning out a global economic, political and legal, tradition, and a form of laws/guiding 
principles to be applied on all people and nations. For instance, she supports Kant’s dictation of 
principles like freedom of speech/public forum to stop countries from justifying acts without 
conscienscious consensus;  or encouragement of liberal political culture for the purpose of 38
“civilizing” the people of the world . He not once questions the validity of such claims—or that 39
it is possible that such claims may not be valid. Rather, she expands this unjustified theoretical 
formulation to invade the sovereignty of every individual and state (arguably beyond what Kant 
himself intended). 
The more provocative portion, however, is the legalization of cosmopolitan-like universalist 
laws. Habermas, in reply to Carl Schmitt’s criticisms of the politicization of human rights the 
dismisses of the assumption that “that the politics of human rights serves to implement norms 
that are a part of universalistic morality”. He states that “[t]he conception of human rights does 
not have its origins in morality; rather, it bears the imprint of the modern concept of individual 
liberties and is therefore distinctly juridical in character” , attempting to legally justify such 40
actions taking a tangent. 
Instead of taking a moral position, Habermas inserts the notion of legality that enforces rights, a 
notion that “outstripped Kant.”  Habermas bases his legal defence of Kant on the two major 41
principles; a) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), obligating all member states 
to follow, and b) the UN’s own “right of intervention” in the UN Charter,  being legally 42
justified. This is ground din the notion that all individuals in the world have enforceable rights 
grounded within an international legal process. This is the same, clearer tone adopted by 
Hayden,  who claims in review that the UDHR obligates all governments as such, providing the 43
ICC and justifying legal military intervention. It should be noted that Habermas, though not 
favouring unilateral interventions, still favours the notion of multilateral interventions sanctified 
by the so-called legal process.  Before engaging in a response, it should be understood that 44
although the scholarly discourse has situated itself in a pro/against unilateral interventionist 
scale , I take the stance of the entire notion of intervention, regardless of ‘consensus’ or multi-45
laterality. In response to this line of thought, those stretching beyond the mere morality, I suggest 
two responses. 
 8
International Journal of Political Theory
 | Vol. 1, No. 1 2016 | ISSN: 2371-3321
Published by Emertec R&D
Website: www.emertec.ca
Firstly, there is the legal argument. Wall leads a powerful argument against the theory and 
enforceability of the UDHR. On the theoretical component, he made it clear that the document 
itself did not constitute an authoritative document, but “a statement” upon which to build further 
treaties,  but the documents and the UDHR itself do not provide for a form of enforcement,  46 47
which of course ends up being undertaken by countries like the US, and itself also lacks 
interpretive authority, or even if interpretation is to extend beyond the individual state’s own 
interpretive mechanisms.  Such lack of discrepancy has several effects that all found itself 48
within the notion of arbitrary interpretation and implementation,  and arbitrary, suppressive 49
enforcement of the Unites States upon other nations that it deems to be,  and the imposition of 50
western/global human rights values over other human rights values (like Indian and Islamic 
ones),  emanating from the fact that there is no such thing as a singly interpretable set of ‘human 51
rights’, which finds itself as diverse as there are cultures. He dedicates the rest of the article to 
examining the arbitrariness of this enforcement in the case of the Unites States. To Habermas, it 
is interesting to observe that the US itself is not bound by the rules it implements—the UN 
therefore cannot be accepted as any sort of bearer of human rights or legal standard, and 
therefore cannot have legal validity itself-being non-enforceable. 
The second response takes a more logical outlook. Thomas Jefferson once said, “If a law is 
unjust, a man is not only right to disobey it, he is obligated to do so.”  In the case of 52
international law, theoretically, laws are expected to be created on moral grounds—state 
signatories to agreements reasonably except moral legal structures and laws. One must then ask 
if it is right to agree, or continue to agree, to a convention or a law brought by a consented-upon 
legal arrangement if they don’t consider it right. My intention is not to say that laws have no 
meaning, nor do I want to engage in such a discussion. However, I find it rather peculiar that 
certain people apply legality to be more valuable than morality when it fits their agendas—as 
some supporters of international legal standards claim. I would simply assert that it is the same 
group of scholars who would want an enforceable legal standard to be created in the name of 
morality. If that is the case, it would be a double-standard to claim that law takes precedence 
over morality (to prevent moral injustice the previous legal system applies). From this premise, it 
follows that a state, either do to a change in outlook or in regime, would logically have the right 
to revoke international obligations without pending enforcement (which, by the way, doe snot 
even exist in the first place). It is form the moral backdrop that further discussion will ensue; the 
case of the ICC. 
The ICC is a treaty-based criminal court, providing ‘objective’ criminal tribunals and holding 
committers of certain crimes to account through this court. That being said, the ICC gives itself 
jurisdictional authority to all people, even non-parties to the agreement, and non-state actors. 
Such people may be captured, tried and punished accordingly. Akande states that in legal terms, 
such authority is allowed, as non-party actors/states are neither obligated, or required to refrain 
from any terms—that fact that a state’s interests (especially American) may be affected does not 
qualify as an imposition . The ICC states that it has jurisdiction over even non-consenting 53
parties if approved by the UN Security Council , or when “the "conduct in question" took place 54
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on the territory of a state party, or on one of its flag vessels or aircraft, regardless of the 
accused's nationality.”  55
Right off the bat, there are two important observations; one about the legality, and the other on 
the ICC’s general nature. Firstly, the suggestion that any authority simply has the right to subject 
legal, non-consenting citizens to another form of law is simply not justified. Casey and Rivkin 
point out the blatantly obvious: the fact that the Rome Statute imposes its jurisdiction upon any 
nation and rule of law in the world violates the fundamental understanding that all states are 
sovereign and equal in their legal sovereignty —even the claimed proposition of an arrest 56
warrant without consent is ridiculous. This logic also derives from the fact that all individuals are 
equal, providing that all individuals can have a logical foothold for this claim—the logic that all 
individuals are equal ideologically and that no person can rightfully or with absolute proof that 
they are morally superior; hence applying not just to states but all others as well. “By asserting 
power over the civilian and military officials of non-party states, the Rome Statute clearly 
violates the sovereign equality of those countries as guaranteed by international law.”  57
Furthermore, I would take this a step much further, invoking the above discussion on “legality” 
vs. “morality”. As I have previously stated, because legal grounds do not imply moral grounds, 
even in a case where a signatory to the rome statute, or a member of the UN (subject to the 
jurisdiction of the UN Security Council) could simply revoke its agreement; theoretically 
(morally) and enforceability-wise, no institutional body can claim right over another, no 
individual over another. It follows that a county like Iran (as it has) that revoked its association 
with the UDHR due to unIslamic values formulated within it,  is certainly morally permitted to 58
do so. When law is base don morality, and it cannot be defined, then laws—which themselves 
carry not enforcer—can be revoked. Similarly, even non-state parties that don’t consent cannot 
be captured, or subject to any such jurisdiction. This gradual and general process, which is 
ultimately a question of morality in everyone’s eyes (whether making or not making law), of 
justifying war and gradual attempts to fit the world under a certain jurisdiction, is not morally 
justified, and bares just as much legitimacy as any form of imperialism does. 
5 The final hope: multicultural universalism? 
Even from a western (more-or-less) liberal orientation, Rawls, Nussbaum, Pogge, and other 
diverging advocated for global governance have managed to vie for a final gasp of 
argumentation, the groundbreaking claim that the nature of liberalism—its taking into 
consideration and a formulation of all peoples’ concerns—is not imperialistic, but the ultimate 
way to peacefully coexist. In other words, liberalism can be justifiably enforced because it is 
truly universal and pluralistic. Ralph best summarizes liberal cosmopolitanism as “a political 
stance that is committed to nothing more than the defence of institutions that enable the 
expression of diverse opinions and of the defence of values that emerge from a reasoned dialogue 
across those opinions.”  The claim then could be made that liberal cosmopolitanism, such as 59
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that found in the form of the ICC is not imperialistic because it inherently takes all legal 
traditions and cultures into consideration. 
Ralph, again, looks at the case of the ICC in order to prove such a point. Though I have my 
reservations towards the validity of the liberal argument which are discussed in the end, it is 
important to review the ICC case. Ralph claims three points: that (a) nearly all civilizations have 
the basic expectation of morality and rights accepted by the west, (b) there is an unbiased, 
independent judiciary, and (c) the ICC itself does not encourage violent intervention—akin to the 
2003 American-Iraq war  (which he clearly opposes, titling such ideology as “Wilsonian” that 60
differentiates between an ultimate subjective understanding of ‘good’ and ‘bad’). Regarding 
point (a) there is no doubting that there is more or less a non-western, global consensus, as found 
in declarations like the UDHR. Despite this, however, though global governance is not a solely 
western agenda, it is still an agenda nonetheless, and still assumes the same moral superiority 
over others. I would, however, dispute this point, arguing that the ICC’s efforts and principles are 
inherently western;  even if certain states (which have obviously been influenced by the west) 61
agree to these western standards. Agreeing to western standards does not change the fact that it is 
a western-imposed—in the sense of imposing it on non-consenters—from an objective point of 
view. Obo and Ekpe  note that it does not reduce the case-by-case arbitrariness of prosecution 62
and other clear western, practical, power-based influences on the ICC. 
This takes us to the second point, how truly independent is the ICC from the western powers? 
Though I will not examine the detailed case-by-case theories the above scholars and others 
elaborated on, I will point out that the so-called universality of the legal traditions is not as it 
seems. In the former section, we saw how divergent the interpretation and diversity of even 
amongst basic “human rights” can be. Some, like Vice President of the International Court of 
Justice, Abdulqawi Yusuf,  believe that “the positive outlook on the endurance of the diversity 63
of legal traditions is justified.” He states this backed by the fact that many regional traditions 
form converge and form international law. He gives the example of the Rome Statute’s provision 
for the existence of “dissenting opinions”  amongst judges, opinions that come from a variety of 64
legal backgrounds.  
There is a major flow in this moral argument. It assumes that there is a reasonable amount of 
diversity amongst judges, that when a panel is more diverse, a lack of cross-cultural 
understanding is made up for. This is unfortunately not the case; after looking within domestic 
law of a given country, especially in places where tribal, ethnic, and cultural differences and 
norms are very different even within the country (let alone from the west), it becomes 
unreasonably hopeful to believe that such deep-rooted, historical, non-generic, isolated cultural 
legal traditions can be fully—or even sufficiently—understood by judges with much less 
experience and understanding. It is also comical to attempt to give legitimacy to interpreting, say, 
African cases, due to the fact that one amongst the panel of judges was born in Africa. It is 
blindly Eurocentric to assume that an “African judge” can possibly represent and understand all 
of the legal traditions and cultures within Africa. Another flaw in the ICC argument that Ralph 
 11
International Journal of Political Theory
 | Vol. 1, No. 1 2016 | ISSN: 2371-3321
Published by Emertec R&D
Website: www.emertec.ca
(among others) makes is that it is impossible to incorporate and interpret law for countries and 
cultures wherein the possessors of the culture reject outsiders interpretations. 
As an example, certain Muslim countries specifically state, in their constitutions, that any non-
divinely-originated law may not be implemented and interpreted, and that those laws and their 
interpretations must be made by Muslim legal scholars from within the respective countries. Any 
notion of governance beyond the Islamic Shari’ah interpretation that the state may have goes 
against the institution and therefore state: countries like Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
and Yemen, Iran, and Sudan.‑  Knowing this makes it unlikely that “subject[ing] citizens of an 65
Islamic state to secular international laws, which gives the ICC jurisdictional power…goes 
directly against the Islamic faith.”‑  I have perilously reviewed and confirmed this claim in 66
much more detail.‑  It cannot be said that the ICC incorporates all forms of law, and inherently 67
assumes that its laws and punishments are standardized and true and apply to all. It cannot 
guarantee a completely understandable and objective analysis, or deal with the fact that some 
forms of law rejecting others’ interpretations implies that any imposition on it would be as such. 
The third point that Ralph makes was refuted by Jürgen Habermas  as a refutation to Carl 68
Schmitt’s claim that liberal humanitarians would eventually treat their illiberal opponents in the 
same inhumane manner the same illiberal treated others. This particular point does not have 
anything to do with the question of moral legitimacy at hand; the question of the morality of 
global governance is a matter of principle, viz. whether or not the ICC and related organizations 
are operating in a principally imperialistic manner.  
All in all, even the liberal attempt to shift the focus from the ICC being a ‘western’ imposition, 
towards being a western-originated and more globally-accept imposition, does not change the 
fact that the internationalist position takes a moral high-ground. The scholarly communitarian 
discourse criticizing this moral high-ground has failed to make a comprehensive defence of their 
criticism of morality, due to the fact that they believe morality is ultimately too subjective to be 
objective. They are caught up into a debate on whether or not institutions like the ICC are as 
diverse and open-minded as they say they are, instead of recognizing the larger picture. The 
picture being that it does not matter whether or not such institutions are western or global—it is 
still an imposition implying moral superiority. 
6 Conclusion 
In our brief overview of the several stances on global governance, there are a few definitive 
points that can be made. Firstly, we reviewed the one-sided, subjective understandings of global 
governance proposed by Kant, that Rawls has taken inspiration from. Those who advocate for 
measures for global governments from a Rawlsian perspective imply a worldview from a 
Eurocentric outlook, and an explicit ranking of “good” and “bad” societies based on this outlook. 
Secondly, in review of legal, rather than moral responses in favour of legal governance, I 
responded with both a legal and logical argument disproving moral validity of the theories 
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backed by discourse ethics. Finally, we reviewed certain scholars’ attempts to demonstrate how 
the ICC, in particular, was not a case of unilateral, imposed intervention, but a case of collective 
reasoning and agreements—the typical liberal cosmopolitan apologetic line of argumentation. 
The reply to the final point, and the point of this article, was to say that in a world with so much 
cultural, religious, and ethnic diversity, interpretive understandings, and moral views of 
governments’ obligations and views on their jurisdiction, that any attempt to impose any sort of 
imperative, is morally, and legally not justified. It is not legally justified as it is not morally 
justified. In such a case, then, any form of non-consenting, multi or uni-lateral action, 
intervention, or attempt to impose governance on others, necessarily implies an amorally 
justified action, whether it is the ICC, international enforcement of the UDHR (or related 
documents), or unilateral intervention. Finally, the point should be made that this article hopes 
not to provide for a basis of extreme pessimism, nihilism, or opposition to the creation of a 
standard. It simply dismisses the notion of the possibility to create a global legal tradition based 
on a world where there are no set standards. Unless it is possible to develop a model of justice 
that can claim absolute truth—which is impossible to assert—,  justice in the eyes of one can be 69
oppression and suppression in the eyes of another. 
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